The official report by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) into the loss of the yacht Ouzo and the deaths of its three-man crew is published today.
The report blames the Ouzo's sinking on a sequence of watchkeeping failures aboard the P&O ferry Pride of Bilbao. As a result, the 37,600 ton ferry is believed to have passed within 30 metres of the Ouzo, which was on a night time passage from Bembridge, Isle of Wight to Dartmouth.
The report concludes that the 25-foot Ouzo was swamped or capsized by the ferry's wash.
As well as failing to carry out essential visual checks before changing course directly towards the Ouzo, the Pride of Bilbao is criticised for not having stopped to institute a search following what her watchkeeper by then knew to have been a near collision.
The watchkeeper reported seeing the yacht's lights astern of the ferry after the incident, which was why he did not feel it necessary to stop, but the report points out that it is likely that her three crew were in the water and in dire need of help.
The MAIB report notes that the Ouzo was known to be well equipped and maintained, while the crew members were experienced sailors.
The subsequent recovery of their bodies showed them to have been dressed in appropriate clothing and wearing functioning life jackets.
The yacht carried a conventional octahedral radar reflector. It is not known whether this was hoisted at the time of the incident, but the yacht had not shown up on the ferry's radar screens, and its lights were only seen by the ferry crew at the last moment.
The RYA says that the sinking of the Ouzo has re-ignited a long-standing debate over the effectiveness of radar reflectors in general and calls on manufacturers to investigate, as a matter of urgency, how their overall performance might be improved
RYA training manager James Stevens said: “Recreational skippers who cross the Channel regularly know that they cannot rely on ships to alter course for yachts or even to pick them up on their radar screens.”
The RYA statement points out that no apportionment of blame can bring back the lives that were lost and concludes that, “it falls to the entire marine community to work together to ensure that every possible lesson arising from this tragedy is put to good use in the future”.
The MAIB has issued flyers to both the leisure and merchant shipping sectors, to highlight those lessons:
Safety issues for yachtsmen
1. Yachts cannot be seen easily from the bridges of ships, and yachtsmen need to be proactive in attracting the attention of the ship's watchkeepers. The crew of Ouzo kept a powerful torch at hand for just such an emergency but, in this case, were probably unaware of the real danger until it was too late. Yachtsmen should not hesitate to attract the attention of ships' watchkeepers by whatever means are available.
2. The lookout on the ferry had not seen the yacht until it was very close ahead.
- The lenses of navigation light units similar to the one fitted to Ouzo are prone to crazing which substantially reduces their efficiency.
- The lamps (bulbs) fitted to the navigation lights used on Ouzo can easily be inadvertently replaced with lamps of a lower rating.
- It is quite common for replacement lamps for yacht navigation lights to have damaged filaments, which cause an intermittent fault.
- If the yacht heels more than 5º the horizontal intensity of her navigation lights may be decreased.
Yacht owners should make every effort to ensure that their navigation lights are fully effective, and their characteristics understood.
3. Ouzo's small radar cross section, coupled with the moderate sea conditions, made it unlikely that the radars on Pride of Bilbao could separate Ouzo from the sea clutter even if Ouzo had been displaying her octahedral radar reflector. A study of the capabilities of typical radar reflectors that may be fitted to yachts will be published on the MAIB website on 1 May 2007. Yacht owners should be encouraged to fit the best radar reflector they can afford.
4. One of the crew members survived in the water very much longer than the others probably due to the fact that he had fitted his lifejacket tightly. The simple addition of a crotch strap would have significantly increased the survival times of the yachtsmen. Crotch straps should not be optional extras on lifejackets; they should be supplied, fitted and worn.
5. After the incident, the alarm was not raised by the yacht's crew.
- There was probably too little time before the yacht's crew found themselves in the sea. A hand-held VHF set in a waterproof cover could have provided a means of sending a distress alert.
- The boat did not carry an EPIRB and/or a liferaft rigged with a hydrostatic release unit. An EPIRB and/or a liferaft would have dramatically increased the crew's chances of survival.
Safety Issues for merchant shipping
1. The lookout on the ferry had not seen the yacht until it was very close ahead. There are several possible reasons for this, including:
- The lookout was wearing glasses with photochromic lenses. Research carried out for the investigation has concluded that his glasses stopped at least 20% of light and, furthermore, all photochromic lenses stop a significant proportion of light. Photochromic lenses should not be worn by bridge lookouts at night.
- On the morning of the incident, there was significant light pollution on the bridge of Pride of Bilbao due to poor blackout procedures. For visual lookout to be effective, blackout curtains should be used to keep stray light to a minimum.
- The lookout first saw the yacht when he had been on the bridge for 9 minutes. His eyes were still adapting to the dark at that time, and it is possible that he did not see the light earlier because of this. Handovers of 15 minutes should be allowed for a lookout's eyes to become sufficiently adapted to the dark.
2. The yacht had not shown up on the ferry's radars. Yachts of the size and construction of Ouzo have very poor radar reflectivity even with a radar reflector displayed. Radar reflectivity is reduced further in moderate or rough sea conditions. At least one of the ferry's radars was adjusted using automatic clutter control. Radars should be routinely switched to manual clutter control to check for small targets.
3. The ferry did not stop to assist, or attempt to communicate with the yacht after the incident. Although the officer had seen a light astern, this did not mean that the yacht was safe: in fact it is likely that her three crew were in the water and in dire need of help. The effect of a large fast ship passing close to a small boat can be extremely dangerous and, in these circumstances, every effort should be made to ensure that the boat is safe before continuing the passage.
Further details on the accident and the subsequent investigation can be found in the MAIB's investigation report, which is posted on its website: www.maib.gov.uk
Michael Hubble, 61, the officer of the watch on the Pride of Bilbao, denied three counts of manslaughter due to gross negligence when he appeared at Winchester Crown Court last month. Mr Hubble, from Folkestone, Kent, is due to face trial on October 29th.
